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Monthly
Lecture: 11-2005
Unconscious
Competence:
What is it? How can we train for it?[1]
By:
Martin D.
Topper, Ph.D.,
Jack M. Feldman, Ph.D.
What Is Unconscious Competence?
NOTE: This
paper, written by Dr. Feldman and Dr. Topper, was used as part of the NTI Study
Group discussion on October 15, 2005.
Skip Gochenour included ‘comments’ (distinguished by blue print) in this
paper for the Study Group discussions.
None of these (blue) comments should be attributed to Dr. Feldman or Dr.
Topper.
This effort by Feldman and
Topper is welcome as a scientific description of the model used by ATSA during
the 15-year history of operation.
The term “Unconscious
Competence,” is used by members of the American Tactical Shooting Association
and others in the training community to describe a rapid, seamless and
successful response to a situation involving deadly force or the potential for
deadly force. It is a term many believe
they inherently understand, but which is, in reality, very hard to define.
For
example, what does the word “unconscious” imply? Obviously, it doesn’t mean unconsciousness as in a boxer who’s
been KO’ed. Most people who use the
term unconscious competence are really describing an effective action performed
outside of focal awareness. People who have achieved unconscious competence in
some area (e.g. music, baseball, self-defense) can carry out an action or
sequence of actions at a high level of performance without being focally aware
of the precise details of their own behavior. They are aware of their goal
(playing a blues tune, hitting a curve ball, engaging a threat) and whether or
not they are achieving their goal. But
they are not aware of the details of the separate components of their actions.
Unconscious competence is an imprecise term
used to describe a level of competence that exists along a continuum. The range of the continuum includes the
equally imprecise terms, unconscious incompetence, conscious incompetence and
conscious competence. Each of these
terms is selected to impart a concept of stage development residing in a
Practitioner as the Practitioner makes his way along the path to a level of
functioning that allows him to devote the maximum attention to continual
evolution of the changing circumstance before him.
Few, if indeed any, Practitioners will ever
reach a level of unconscious competence in each of the several and varied
components of mechanical skills sets, intuitive handling of situational
evolution and strictures of operating legal/moral behavior models required of
the Practitioner during crisis incidents.
Instead, Practitioners will see different levels of performance within
themselves in each category as well as specific elements of each category. The process of individual examination allows
the Practitioner to identify the elements and/or categories that need further
development.
The question asked by Practitioners is, “How do
I know when I am operating at unconscious competence?” As the authors note, this level of
competence occurs in all forms of endeavor that requires skill set. Carrying forward the musical example
suggested by the authors, a simple comment by a professional musician to a well
accomplished amateur in the conscious competence class is illustrative. After watching the performance of the
accomplished amateur the professional explained that the student must, “Learn
to hear the music.” The musician meant
that so little “focal awareness” was being consumed in the mechanics of
operating the instrument that the player could actually hear the performance of
himself and other musicians. The
musician could even engage in communication with the audience as he played.
High end IPSC shooters describe a similar
experience when they discuss “just monitoring the systems” as they traverse a
field course. They describe seeing
expended brass as it flies through the air and the ability to know by feel when
the firearm has not completely return to battery. Such master class shooters even describe hearing conversations
among spectators. They have the luxury
of monitoring systems because of their high skill level and the choreographed
nature of their shooting problem.
The point is that these high end practitioners
in their respective endeavors require only minimal focus apportioned to the
physical requirements of their performance, allowing a maximum amount of that
awareness to interact with their environment.
In the area of self-defense, the
unconsciously competent person knows he or she is responding to a threat and
perceives threat’s overall response to their actions. In a gunfight, this means the person defending him/herself is not
paying attention to how they are drawing their gun or to how many shots they’ve
fired. The defender’s attention is
locked on the assailant’s aggressive actions and the assailant’s response to
the shots fired by the defender. If the
defender is well-trained he/she may also be scanning the environment for
multiple assailants and for cover. But
if the defender finds cover and decides to move to it, he/she is probably still
focusing on the threat and on fighting all the way to that cover, rather than
thinking about how many steps are required to get to safety. So the “unconscious” in unconscious
competence really refers to selective awareness in which the defender is
focused on the threat, tactics and evolving outcome rather than the precise
details of his/her own behavior.
In a state of “unconscious competence” the
Practitioner is still able to solve problems that training drills do not
anticipate. Circumstances that cause
fouling of the presentation can be corrected with a minimal amount of temporary
diversion of awareness resources. The
remainder of the awareness is available to monitor the evolution of the
situation.
Practitioners may well be able to assess the
level at which they are accomplishing their goals and apply modifications to
problem solution. The Practitioner may
well be able to decide such details as the order in which threats need to be
addressed and the number of rounds to be used on each problem as well as the
placement of the shots. Additionally,
the Practitioner may be able to solve with minimal depletion of focal awareness
resources needed modifications in presentation drills and weapons function due
to the need to work with other than customary equipment.
“Competence” isn’t easy to define
either. That’s because competence is
context-dependent. A person can be a
champion bullseye shooter and miss the target completely in a shoot house or in
force-on-force training. As Bruce
Siddle explains in Sharpening the Warrior’s Edge, a person fighting
to stay alive must be competent to perform under high levels of stress and arousal.
Furthermore, “competence” in one situation may be both quantitatively and
qualitatively different from competence in another. Therefore, the “competence” aspect of unconscious competence
refers to the ability to successfully implement learned behaviors and achieve a
defined objective in a specific context or set of similar contexts in an
automatic manner.
The purpose of UC operation is to allow the
practitioner to apply varied methods of theoretical behavior that may seemingly
have demands that arte inconsistent with those provided by the mechanical skill
models. E.g. A training model may
suggest the response of continuing to engage a threat with gunfire until “there
is nothing visible except the front sight”.
The over-riding strictures of the legal/moral model combined with subtle
changes in the immediate occurrence may require a cessation of the execution of
that full response before the dictates of that response can be meant.
A Practitioner who can “hear the music” is able
to modify his response models, often in real-time creative fashion, in response
to an add-mixture of circumstances comprised of varying amounts of
environmental, situational, operational and legal/moral model awareness. Practitioners in the evolution phase from
high-end CC to low-end UC may not be able to modify an imprinted response
model. E.g. A Practitioner may
incorporate movement on presentation so successfully into his response model
that it is done “unconsciously” during a presentation. That is not indicative of a UC skill
operating level. The ability to select
or de-select that technique applications dictated by the circumstances without
conscious thought is an example of UC operation.
By way of testing specific Practitioners for
their level of operation an experiment with a FATS system could be used. Test subjects could be selected through
their believed level of skill established through a review of their training
resume’ and some observation in range exercises while using their personally
chosen equipment. The Practitioner
would then be stripped of his chosen equipment and issued transport systems,
weapons operating platforms, and cover garments different from those personally
chosen. The test subject would then be
taken into a darkened environment, auditory and visual noise would be
introduced while complex operational problems are presented requiring
legal/moral consideration. Observation
of the Practitioners ability to sort out the details of handling unfamiliar
equipment while continuing to apply techniques modified in real-time to fit the
nature of the problem could be observed and further understood by post
operation interview of the subject.
While the plastic environment of the FATS system
may not replicate an in-field encounter, it will give the testers a view of the
operating skill level of the individual Practitioner and allow for further
shaping of the training models to be employed to progress along the UI-UC
continuum.
The demands of the legal/moral components of
operating models vary by venue and sub-venue.
A military venue can vary by war zone ROE-UOF, guest/host over-seas
ROE-UOF and domestic martial law ROE-UOF.
Similarly, domestic police and legally armed citizens can find themselves
in sub-venues operation for their respective legal/moral models.
Military operators in a war zone could find
situations where they as tasked with “trolling” for targets of
opportunity. In a sense they are
encouraging unlawful combatants to reveal themselves so that they may be
killed. Domestically, police may use
similar tactics to draw out VCA, but are required to use techniques designed
primarily to take custody of the target, using deadly force only as a last
resort for self-defense. Armed citizens
would be required to constantly monitor the evolution of any incident for each
opportunity to avoid, disengage, escape and evade before using deadly force.
For the
purposes of this discussion, we’ll define an unconsciously competent person as
one who recognizes a situation/problem without first having to perceive it in
focal awareness and then implements a learned set of behaviors to resolve that
situation/problem without having to mediate the behavioral response in focal
awareness. In the case of self-defense, focal awareness is reserved for
analyzing “big picture” issues, such as monitoring the on-going course of the
interaction with the assailant/potential assailant. This monitoring allows the
individual to recognize` when the situation has become less “safe,” and allows
him/her to implement an appropriate defensive or alerting response. It also allows him/her to recognize when the situation has become
“safe” and terminate a defensive response, or implement a follow-up response at
a lower level of the force continuum.
This is very similar to what psychologists have referred to as
“recognition-primed decision-making.”
The process of evaluating “less safe” is a
continual evaluation that compares the then existing circumstance with the
evolving circumstances and applies the dictates of the operant legal/moral
model that forms restraining judgments in the Practitioner.
To be sure,
the defender’s response can still be described in terms of Col. John Boyd’s
process of Observing, Orienting, Deciding and Acting (i.e. the OODA Loop).
However, solving the tactical problem is not undertaken through a
process of bringing observations into full awareness, orienting to the details
of the situation, weighing the pros and cons of alternative responses and then
implementing a step-by-step remedy.
Instead, the unconsciously competent individual begins responding
appropriately as he or she first becomes aware of the threat. Therefore he/she
orients while observing and acts while deciding, and none of these cognitive
processes take place in focal awareness.
For this reason, people who have experienced a critical incident
involving deadly force are often unable to describe the exact, step-by-step
process by which they defended themselves.
The inability of the Practitioner to accurately
recite his observations is actually a failure to record the information in
memory rather than an inability to perceive what is occurring in
real-time. It is a form of amnesic
event.
But how can
someone act appropriately before fully perceiving the details of an emerging
situation? On the surface, this sounds
impossible. Yet think for a
moment. Most of us do this all the
time. Ever steer your car through a
skid on slick pavement? Do you stop and
observe, “Damn! I’m skidding to the left!”
Then orient yourself by saying, “Remember, I’m driving a rear wheel
drive car, and the lane to my left is empty.” Then tell yourself, “Therefore,
my decision is to take my foot slowly off of the gas and steer into the
skid.” And finally say to yourself,
“Okay Joe, now slowly lift your right foot from the gas while you use your arms
and hands to slowly turn the wheel to the left.”
Of course
you don’t! You begin maneuver almost
instantaneously as the visual image in your brain perceives your car leaving
its lane and your kinesthetic sense tells you that your car is moving in a
direction you don’t want it to go.
The example of the car in the skid reveals a
Practitioners ability to use legal/moral models in making decisions in
real-time. As the Practitioner responds
to the skid he is still able to monitor the evolving situation. Additional circumstances can develop to
cause the Practitioner to maneuver the vehicle, even with little traction to
account for these changing circumstance.
The Practitioner may be forced to choices between various bad options,
selecting the least worse of those forced upon him. The choices may include placing the Practitioner in a
circumstance where others included in the incident have their survivability
likelihood raised while the survivability likelihood of the Practitioner is
reduced. This decision process is
instantaneous and causes the Practitioner to comfortably take action to
optimize what limited input he has into the outcome of the event.
This form of real-time decision making that
changes the survivability ration for the respective participants in such events
is regularly seen in pilots of aircraft.
But how can
this all happen at once? Currently, the best explanation is provided by
psychologist Gary Klein in Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions. He’s proposed that the human brain is
capable of multi-tasking. His theory
works like this: A visual image is
picked up by the retina and is transmitted to the visual center of the brain in
the occipital lobe. From there the
image is sent to two locations in the brain. On the one hand, it goes to the
higher levels of the cerebral cortex, which is the seat of full conscious
awareness. There, in the frontal lobes,
the image is available to be recognized, analyzed, input into a decision
process and acted upon, as the person considers appropriate. Let’s call this “the slow track,” because
full recognition of the meaning of a visual image, analyzing what it represents,
deciding what to do and then doing it takes time. Some psychologists also refer
to this mental process as System II cognition. If you used System II cognition
in critical situations like a skid, you wouldn’t have enough time to finish
processing the OODA Loop before your car went over the cliff.
Fortunately,
there’s a second track, which we’ll call “the fast track,” or System I
Cognition. In this system, the image is also sent to a lower, pre-conscious
region of the brain, which is the amygdala. This area of the brain stores
visual memory and performs other mental operations as well. The visual image is compared here on a
pre-conscious level at incredible speed with many thousands of images that are
stored in memory. Let’s call each image
a “frame” which is a term that Dr. Erving Goffman used in his book Frame
Analysis to describe specific, cognitively-bounded sets of
environmental conditions. I like to use
the word “frame” here because the memory probably contains more than just
visual information. There may be sound,
kinesthetic, tactile, olfactory or other sensory information that also helps
complement the visual image contained within the frame.
Each of
these frames has been recorded in the brain through personal life experience
and each is associated in the brain’s motor centers with a behavioral routine,
or set of routines, which, again by experience, the individual has learned are
appropriate responses. As the
pre-frontal areas of the brain scan the visual/sensory information it receives,
they attempt to match it to the frames that are stored in memory, most likely
in a hierarchical manner.[2] When a match or near match is made to a
frame that contains a situation which represents a serious threat to the safety
of the individual the pre-frontal areas that have received the sensory input
immediately send a message to the brain’s motor center initiating what the
individual has learned is the most appropriate response to that frame. By the time the higher levels of the brain
realize that there is a problem, the solution is already in progress. The higher levels then switch to
co-monitoring the progress of the solution to ensure the response is indeed the
proper one. If so, and if the situation
contained in the frame is successfully resolved, the pre-frontal brain returns
control of behavior to the higher levels of the cortex. If not, both levels of
the brain continue to work toward an appropriate resolution.
Of course,
the situation isn’t quite that simple.
There is a complex interaction between the higher levels of the brain and
the pre-frontal areas, and the possibility always exists that the two can get
out of synchronization or the individual may encounter a situation for which
he/she has no frame that’s even close. At that point, a fatal error is
possible, unless the various levels of the brain can work quickly together to
craft a new adaptive routine.
Fortunately, the fast and slow tracks are usually complimentary, one
focusing on insight, the other on action. Together they produce a synergistic
effect that enhances the actor’s chances of survival.
NTI sees this in tests that involve the failure
of Practitioners to recognize RPG’s or grenades tossed in an open door.
But even
though these two tracks are complimentary, we know that some people seem to be
much more skilled than others at integrating System 1 and System 2. These especially competent individuals seem
to resolve critical situations and also adapt to rapid changes in those
situations. They invent routines they
have never before performed and act in a fluid, seamless manner without
employing full focal awareness.
The ability to “invent” routines does not
spring from nothingness. There must be
some background for the invention.
Because critical incidents that form the nature of this discussion are
based on behavior in the aggressor, it is useful to develop a reservoir of
recognition skills in recognizing antecedent behavior.
That means the Practitioner must daily practice
evaluating human behavior from a motive/context matrix. That can only be successfully done by
accepting behavior for what it is rather than what the Practitioner wishes it
to be.
That does not mean the Practitioner operates
from a morbid perspective, seeing bad in all situations until otherwise
proven. It means the Practitioner
practices reading motive and context in the behavior of each person he
encounters until confident that he is making accurate calls.
The more the Practitioner practices creativity,
the more he is prepared to engage in spontaneous creativity. It is a skill to be learned and practiced.
Some schools are better at communicating
“inventing” skills.
So at this
point in our understanding, we have a model that tells us something about how
the brain can operate on two tracks at the same time, but we don’t really have
a good idea of how the two levels interact, except to say that the interaction
is very complex, and some people do it better than others. We really don’t know everything we’d like to
know. But we do know that specific
types of training can help a person develop unconscious competence, and this is
enough to make some suggestions about the kind of training that will help make
relatively unskilled people more competent in finding solutions to potentially
violent encounters.
Training
How can a
self-defense trainer take a person who is already has the capability to
multi-task, but who does not have the knowledge base or the motor skills to swiftly
and competently resolve self-defense problems, and help him/her learn to
multi-task in self-defense contexts? The answer seems straightforward.
To use a computer analogy: upgrade their software and add RAM. By upgrading software we mean increasing the
capacity to perform mental operations through the acquisition of new frames and
associated behavioral routines. By
adding RAM we are referring to the biological process by which new cell
assemblies are formed within the brain and by which existing ones are
reinforced. The process of developing
cell assemblies is triggered by training, especially when it’s done under
stress. Training stimulates the brain to create new synapses, or connections,
between brain cells. This process
strings brain cells together in neural nets called “assemblies.” Training-induced synaptic growth therefore
allows the various regions of the brain to communicate more efficiently. This growth also allows for the creation of
new thought patterns, because thought itself is an emergent property of the
cellular structure and bio-chemical processes of the brain.
In order to
grow the type of cell assemblies needed to resolve self-defense problems, the
instructor needs to move beyond teaching basic shooting skills and teach the
trainee to respond to frames. That’s
because there’s a significant difference between training that builds basic, or
even advanced, shooting skills on a “square range” and training which builds
tactical competence in the context of critical incidents. Both types of training are necessary, but
simply teaching shooting skills provides behavioral routines that are unconnected
to real life threats.
To have a
tactically competent individual, one must teach behavioral solutions to
problems that are presented in the form of frames. Otherwise, the trainee will simply apply the same basic skills to
a broad variety of situations, regardless of whether they are appropriate for
those various contexts. For example, a trainee who has only been trained on a
square range may simply stand in front of an armed assailant, draw, “double
tap” the target, lower the pistol and wait for the next command. If the trainee shoots well, and if the
assailant’s central nervous system is compromised by the trainee’s fire, then
all may turn out well. However, if the
assailant does not immediately succumb to his injuries, then the trainee could
very well wind up being fatally wounded by return fire while subconsciously
waiting for the next range command.
However, an
instructor can’t just offer the trainee a few frames and then teach their
corresponding frame-specific solutions.
The instructor must present both a rich variety of frames and an equally
broad variety of appropriate remedies.
Imparting a broader number of frames and solutions helps the trainee
understand the complexity and variability of self-defense contexts and starts
him/her on the road to developing situational awareness.
This is a
good start, but it’s still not sufficient to engender what we consider to be
true competence. That’s because
competence doesn’t only involve the speedy application of a learned response to
a known situation, it also includes the behavioral flexibility to appropriately
respond to situations that are similar to, but not exactly alike, those frames
which have been learned in training. To
teach this, an instructor must employ training frames that are open-ended, and
“branch” (evolve) depending either upon actions taken by the trainee, or by
changes in the trainee’s environment that are beyond his/her control. The reason for this is simple. A trainer will never be able to anticipate
all the frames that the trainee will need to experience in order to
successfully handle the broad variety of potential threats he or she may
experience on the street. The trainer
also will never be able to teach all appropriate behaviors that a trainee may
need to implement to resolve such a diverse set of tactical problems. Therefore, training must provide frames that
challenge the trainee to develop his/her own responses.
So far
we’ve discussed a training approach that could fit any skill that humans can
perform. But how does this approach
specifically apply to teaching people to survive in situations that are likely
to escalate into deadly force confrontations?
That’s done by employing frames and responses that are based on
real-life deadly force encounters. In short, the instructor must add the
appropriate context.
The instructor must also be able to impart the
models for forming restraining judgments in the Practitioner and the aggressor
as a result of the actions of the Practitioner.
Assuming
that the psychological theories described above are correct, and that the
brain’s cognitive structure has an insight-based slow track and an action-based
fast track, we propose that context-relevant “frame training” for self-defense
is best accomplished on three levels.
The first level includes two types of training: insight development
through formal instruction and defensive skill drills. Insight development is fostered by using
audio-visual instructional aids, like the al-Qaeda videos. This type of training offers the trainee
cognitive frames or “constructs” by bringing them into full focal
awareness. Doing so, affords maximum
frame image resolution. Such detailed
constructs are very important for conveying meaning, so that the trainee can
interpret the frame, and internalize the kind and level of danger that the
visual image represents. It also gives
the trainee an idea of how behavior within the frame flows. In short, it lets the trainee know his/her
enemy’s tactics and gives the trainee a chance to begin planning ways to
neutralize those tactics. This type of
training creates new recognition software and it also promotes the development
of cell assemblies in the higher, cognitive areas of the brain, which are very
useful in the overall monitoring of one’s own behavior and the behavior of the
assailant.
The second
type of training on level one, defensive skill drills, involves teaching the
full force continuum, from verbal judo and unarmed defensive techniques through
deadly force. This training focuses on
developing cell assemblies that are associated with motor pathways. These are the behavioral routines that are
triggered by the pre-frontal brain when it receives the sensory input that
tells it something is very wrong. With
respect to these routines we always must remember that we have to construct
them out of behaviors that are appropriate to a human body that is heavily
influenced by the physiological and psychological responses caused by a rush of
adrenalin. In short, they must be
focused on gross motor skills and they must account for the perceptual changes
that are common when a person is undergoing what has commonly been referred to
as the “flight, fight or freeze” response. With respect to training, Bruce
Siddle demonstrates that skill sets should be taught in discrete, progressive
units with a great deal of positive reinforcement, because “confidence builds
competence.”
Confidence/confidence is falsely earned w/o
actual testing that does not insure a successful outcome. In fact, avoiding the instruction of failure
is more likely to induce panicked reaction in the Practitioner when he
perceives things are not going to guarantee success. The Practitioner must learn to continue to fight w/o regard to
the end outcome. He must learn that
there will be time when, at the end of the fight he may not be able to get
up. He must never learn that a fight
can end because he will not get up.
Wrestling and boxing are good contact sports to practice this
skill. It is important to learn
confidence/competence in circumstance where failure is always a likely outcome.
In teaching critical incident/VCA management,
role playing exercises is fundamentally important. It is particularly valuable for the Practitioner to engage in
role playing as the VCA. He must
understand the “flow” of the evolving incident and what causes him to form
restraining judgments and what emboldens him in the actions of the
Practitioner. Understanding how the
behavior of the Practitioner either emboldens or causes restraint form
judgments aids the Practitioner in sensing when he is successful and needs to
change his approach.
The second
level of training may either be done under the direction of a trainer or as
self-training. Let’s call it
“visualized interaction.” It takes at
least two major forms: pure visualization and judgment training using
audio-visual training simulators. In
either case, the trainee connects a visual image of a frame with a set of
appropriate behaviors. In pure
visualization, the trainee only imagines the behavioral solutions to the
problem. When audio-visual simulators
like FATS are used, the trainee actually implements the behavioral solution to
the visual and, in the case of most simulators, auditory stimuli associated
with the frame. In both types of
visualized interaction training, the trainee adds new “software” frames and
cell assemblies. These serve both the
fast and slow tracks and they also serve to enhance performance in the motor
areas that initiate the appropriate behaviors for solving the problem presented
in the visualized frames.
Audio-visual
simulators like FATS conduct training in real time, and this produces emotional
stress that causes hormonal changes in the bloodstream. On the one hand, because cell assembly
production is stimulated by stress hormones, audio-visual simulators probably
offer more effective training than pure visualization, especially if branching
scenarios are used. On the other hand,
these audio-visual simulators produce stress.
Effective learning under stress requires short sessions and longer
periods of recovery if the student is to learn without being traumatized. Therefore, pure visualization can be an
important ancillary training technique to the use of audio-visual scenarios. However, one must remember that the
stressful nature of real-time, realistic training requires that the instructor
keep the exercises discrete and focused and that he/she provide constructive
critiques immediately after the session concludes. Properly constructed real-time training is no place for a Hollywood
Drill Instructor, either on this second level or on the next one.
The third
and final level of training involves role-playing. This is the level where unconscious competence is truly
built. This level employs
multi-stimulus, problem-solving scenario-based training. It is multi-stimulus because it involves
frames that are populated with more than audio-visual stimuli. Smell, touch and even taste should be
involved in these frames. In addition,
the frames should involve linguistic and kinesthetic stimuli in the form of
targets and role players that communicate and move in meaningful ways and
confront the trainee at different locations within the trainees’ personal
spatial and emotional “comfort zones.” To
the greatest degree possible, hostile and non-hostile targets should convey
stimuli that involve linguistic and proxemic information in the areas of verbal
language, “body language” and spatial relationships.
Generally,
this type of training involves three forms of scenario-based exercises: the
shoot house, red gun exercises and force-on-force training with simunitions,
paintball or air soft training guns. To
the degree that they can, shoot houses should be interactive. They should have life-like hostile and
non-hostile targets that respond with both movement and verbal communication to
the actions of the trainee. This will
allow the instructors to branch the scenario to the greatest degree possible
and require the trainee to interact with a flexible rather than a static
frame. In addition, shoot houses should
introduce stimuli that are distracting and extraneous to the scenario, like
smoke or loud music. The shoot house may also present complicating factors that
reduce information, e.g. via low light. Adding such sensory complexity will
create sensory challenges that will help the trainee develop his or her ability
to discriminate between information that is vital to understanding the frame
and solving the problem and information that is simply “noise” which has to be
screened out. It will also teach the
trainee to deal with a lack of information.
Regardless of whether the scenario contains extraneous stimuli or lacks
important stimuli such sensory challenges teach the trainee to maintain focus at
an appropriate level on the tactical problem presented in the frame. This is an
extremely important cognitive skill that must be learned if a person is to
competently recognize and neutralize threats.
The advantage of the red-gun exercise is that
it removes the “Yosemite Sam reflex of when do I shoot my gun.
Red gun and force-on-force training are perhaps the most
effective forms of multi-stimulus, problem-solving scenario-based training
because they offer the most opportunity for the frame to change both in
response to the trainee’s actions and in response to the actions of the role
players, who the trainee can influence but not control. The trainee can hide from a target in a
shoot house, but he/she may not be able to escape so easily from a role player. The frame flexibility found in role-playing
training most closely approximates real life.
However, since all role-playing scenarios are constrained to some degree
by the structure of the facility in which they are conducted, even this most
flexible form of training will always exhibit less variation than actual events
one might encounter on the street or in military combat. Still, role-playing is the best tool we have
at present.
One added
teaching element in red gun and force-on-force training is increased
consequences, either through reinforcement or by punishment. These types of exercises contain both
psychological rewards and real penalties for the trainee. If the trainee makes
a mistake in evaluating the frame he/she will be robbed, assaulted or even
“killed.” Simunitions, paintball and
air soft exercises add an additional level of consequence above red gun
training because pellet impacts are a clear reminder that the trainee has done
something very wrong. Being hit with
simunitions makes a lasting impression. Conversely, escaping a difficult
situation or defeating a threat that shoots back gives one a sense of emotional
satisfaction that is highly reinforcing.
So force-on-force training doesn’t just teach good habits, it deeply
ingrains them.
However,
there is one caveat that must be mentioned when discussing multi-stimulus,
problem-solving, scenario-based level three training. The frames must be constructed so that they are somewhat above
the current skill level of the trainee, but they should not be so difficult
that they are over his/her head. The
teaching frames must challenge, not overwhelm, the trainee. If the scenario is too far beyond the
trainee’s ability, then the trainee may become traumatized, develop a lack of
self-confidence and simply give up on developing new skills. This could have serious potential
consequences if the trainee ever becomes involved in a critical incident
involving deadly force.
Unconscious Competence
“Unconscious
competence” may not be completely understood, but we know it when we see it. For now, we’ll have to live with the fact
that the psychological and neurological sciences are not sufficiently advanced
for us to offer a detailed description of how competence is encoded in the
brain and executed through split-second decision-making.
However,
our understanding is sufficient to create a model of unconscious competence and
develop teaching points based on that model. This can be tested and applied to
real life. Reports of actual critical
incidents involving deadly force indicate that people who are trained to
resolve problems that are presented in frame-based, multi-stimulus,
problem-solving scenarios do appear to have a higher probability of both
avoiding violence and of surviving deadly force encounters, on the street and
in combat. Even though this feedback is anecdotal, it argues for both
systematic study and for continuing to train law enforcement officers, military
personnel and law-abiding citizens to not just shoot, but to integrate a whole
range of situational awareness and defensive skills into a meaningful approach
to their everyday personal safety.
________________________________________________________________________
Suggested
Readings:
Gary
Klein, Sources of Power: How People Make
Decisions, Cambridge, MIT Press, 1998.
Erving
Goffman, Frame Analysis, New York,
Harper and Row, 1974.
Bruce
Siddle, Sharpening the Warrior’s Edge,
Millstadt, IL, PPCT Research Publications,
1995.
ATSA
STUDY GROUP
OCTOBER
15, 2005
DTI
DANCE
Pit 3
Props: (3) IDPA
targets with ATSA strike zone. (3)
Target stand systems and (3) Tactical Teds.
One “dummy” round for each caliber and a timer.
Purpose: To allow
the Practitioner practice at fundamental handskills.
Process: The RO
takes one magazine from the Practitioner and downloads the magazine to 5
rounds, 1 of which are a “dummy” round.
The Practitioner inserts the downloaded magazine into his pistol that
has a loaded round in the chamber.
The Practitioner is placed 5 yards from the target array.
On the signal “gun” the Practitioner performs a
presentation while moving off the line of force and engages each target with 2
rounds each. The Practitioner must keep
the weapon functioning by reducing any stoppages.
The Practitioner continues to fire and move off the line
of force until each target is engaged with (4) rounds.
The RO will record the total time for the exercise. He will also record the time from the start
signal to the first shot fired, the time required to reduce any stoppage and
the time to reload. The RO will also
record the number of hits in the ATSA strike zone of each target.
ATSA
STUDY GROUP
October
15, 2005
From One
End to the Other
Pit 2
Props: (5) IDPA
targets with ATSA strike zone on (4) of them.
(5) Target standard systems. An electronic
timer.
Process: The
targets are placed at 3 ft., 5 yds., 10 yds., and 20 yds. and 40 yds. from the
Practitioner.
On the signal “gun” the Practitioner performs a
presentation while moving off the line of force and engages the 3 ft. target
using an immediate danger distance response.
The Practitioner follows up on the 3 ft target with sufficiently aimed
fire to acquire multiple hits in the ATSA strike zones.
The Practitioner continues to engage each target at the
varying distances until multiple hits are accomplished on each target within
the ATSA strike zone. The exception is
the 40 yd target. On this target the
Practitioner must obtain multiple hits within the IDPA strike zone that that
sport designates as a 5.
The RO records the total length of time required for the
exercise, identifying the time required to reduce any stoppages as well as the
source of the stoppage.
ATSA
STUDY GROUP
October
15, 2005
Wrong
Hand
Pit 4
Props: (5) steel
plates and a length of rope sufficient to make a twist loop around the wrist of
the Practitioner, go over his head and keep the hand across the chest.
Process: The
Practitioner is placed at a distance of 15 yds. from the bank of plates. His strong side arm will be placed in a
sling. On the signal “gun” the
Practitioner does a presentation with the weak hand and engages each target
with one round each.
The exercise is repeated two additional times.
The RO records the total time for each run and combines
the three times. 5 seconds is added to
the time for each miss fired.
ATSA
STUDY GROUP
October
15, 2005
FoF
Pit Indoor Range
Props: FoF guns and other drone weapons.
Process: Two
similar exercises are set-up side by side.
The purpose of each exercise is to allow the Practitioner to implement
in real-time a plan to establish situational dominance upon being approached by
role players.
At the conclusion of the first part of the exercise the
Practitioner is debriefed and suggestions are made on how to establish
situational dominance.
The second portion of the exercise is then conducted
allowing the Practitioner to practice the skill he was just given.
[1] This paper was developed for the 15th Annual National Tactical Invitational. It may be reproduced as long as it is not edited in any way and as long as due credit is given to the authors and the American Tactical Shooting Assn. To contact the ATSA write them at 2600 North Third St., Harrisburg, PA 17110, call them at 717-233-0402 or go to www.teddytactical.com. Direct comments to Dr. Topper at Bterr@aol.com or Dr. Feldman at Jackwolf@mindspring.com .
[2] Rapid accessing and matching of mental images of frames to sensory information is most likely accomplished simultaneously by employing several cognitive principles including hierarchical storage and association with goals and emotions. However the exact nature of frame accessing and matching is beyond the scope of this paper.