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Feature
Article: 12-2004
Training for Situation Awareness:
What? How?
By: Jack M.
Feldman, Ph.D.
Note: Born and raised in Chicago,
the author received his Ph.D. in social and industrial psychology from the
University of Illinois in 1972. He is a professor of psychology at the Georgia
Institute of Technology, a Fellow of the American Psychological Association,
and a Charter Fellow of the American Psychological Society. His research
focuses on processes of human judgment and decision-making, both theoretical
and applied. A student of self-defense since 1997, he has made up for lost time
by training with a number of exceptional instructors, none of whom bears any
responsibility for deficiencies in his performance. He is an active competitor
and safety officer in IDPA, a charter member of the Polite Society, and an NTI
participant since 2001.
Thanks to Drs. Larry James and Martin Topper for helpful
comments on an earlier draft of this article. Responsibility for any errors
rests entirely with the author.
“It ain’t what you don’t know that gets you in
trouble.
It’s what you know that just ain’t so.”
Artimus Ward
The Nature of Situation Awareness
“Situation
awareness” (SA) is taught, researched, and debated in every field of human
activity that involves risk: aviation, combat, medicine, hazardous systems
operation, law enforcement—and self-defense (see, e.g. Endsley, 1995; Endsley
& Bolstad, 1994; Endsley & Kiris, 1995; Gonzalez, 2004; Marsh, 2000).
It has been defined in detail (“…the perception
of the elements in [one’s] environment, within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the
projecting of their status in the
near future.” Endsley, 1995, p. 36, emphasis added.) It has also been defined
simply (“…paying attention to your surroundings…” Gonzalez, 2004). However, to
the best of my knowledge, nobody has applied research-based knowledge to the
self-defense problems of ordinary citizens. Neither has anyone tried to link
more recent research on “intuitive awareness” with SA research and practice in
anything but a casual way. The use (or non-use) of intuition, defined as
“thoughts and preferences that come to mind quickly and without much
reflection” or “gut responses” is of major interest to law enforcement
(National Institute of Justice, 2004), public safety (Klein, 1998), and
medicine (King & Appleton, 1997.) Discussion of intuitive factors in
self-defense, however, has been largely anecdotal (e.g. deBecker, 1997).
Specifically absent has been any consideration of how to train or practice
“intuition,” as separate from consciously processed lists of danger signals,
for instance discussion of Cooper’s “color codes” (e.g. Givens, undated a &
b). While informative, they do not tell us how to acquire or use information
that may come to us, and be signaled by, processes that are nonconscious, unintentional,
nonverbal, relatively effortless, fast, and that operate in parallel with
conscious awareness (see, e.g., Bargh, 1994). While often labeled
“instinctive,” these automatic responses are most certainly learned.
For the present, I will adopt Endsley’s (1995) definition,
which supports the point that “awareness” is about understanding in the service
of effective action. I assume an intimate and dynamic connection between
awareness, goals, and action. Though my primary focus is on attention and
comprehension, this assumption should be kept in mind. (Martin Topper, personal
communication.) I also make another useful assumption: that the distinction
between SA as a conscious, controlled, volitional, effortful process and
“intuition” as discussed above is more apparent than real and that in fact both
stem from the same sources, operating in complementary ways. This perspective,
which both contrasts and unifies “controlled” and “automatic” (intuitive or
implicit) processing, is fundamental to many areas of modern psychology (see
Bargh, 1994; Feldman Barrett, Tugade, & Engle, 2004; Slovic, Finucane,
Peters, & MacGregor, 2002[1]).
Adopting this perspective highlights the idea that
awareness need not be conscious, and indeed the capability for consciousness is
not a prerequisite either for SA or for effective action. Anyone observing
predators and prey (whether, say, zebras and lions or squirrels and housecats)
can testify to the high level of awareness any creature must have in order to
survive for any length of time. Regardless of sensory adaptation or
neurological readiness, learning plays a critical role in its development.
Conscious SA may provide detailed information (“There’s a man wearing a jacket
standing near my car, and it’s 2 a.m. in Miami on August 10.”) Intuitive SA may
provide only a feeling of apprehension, directing one’s conscious attention
(see Givens, undated a & b). However, both are based on knowledge, whose
structure and accessibility are crucial to its usefulness.
The
Sources of Situation Awareness
There is no such
thing as “awareness” in the absence of knowledge. That is, SA depends on a
“mental model” (Endsley, 2000) of situations and people, a model which may or
may not be fully correct. Implicit responses likewise depend on knowledge; even
if that “knowledge” cannot be verbalized, it is no less systematic and no less
real. It may have been learned unconsciously, or before one had language with
which to express it (see, for instance, Frensch & Runger, 2003; Katkin,
Wiens, and Oman, 2001), but it functions as knowledge nevertheless. Awareness
is awareness of something, and what that “thing” is depends on our knowledge of
the world. If our knowledge is objectively incorrect, (as in “someone so nice
couldn’t be a rapist,” c.f. deBecker, 1997), our “awareness” is, too, but it is
no less subjectively real.
If SA depends on either explicit or implicit knowledge, it
stands to reason that the amount and structure of that knowledge matters—and it
does. Expertise in any area consists of a vast amount of specific information,
organized and interrelated around general principles. This is what lets the
expert marksman automatically adjust the point of aim when shooting up- or
downhill, without consciously reviewing the principles governing the bullet’s
trajectory, while the novice is trying to remember a rule. It is what lets the
chess grandmaster perceive, not analyze, patterns on the chessboard, and
quickly project moves and countermoves. The very same processes allow rapid,
decisive action in life-or-death situations (see, e.g., Klein, 1998) whether or
not one is consciously aware of the source of one’s intuitive feeling of
apprehension. In fact, it is not even necessary for emotional responses to be
consciously experienced for them to influence judgments and behavior
(Winkielman & Berrige, 2004). Sometimes we don’t “know” (consciously) what
we know.
It is also necessary to point out, though, that “knowing,”
whether conscious or not, whether emotional or verbal, is much more variable
and context-dependent than it seems to be. The patterns of association that
govern our interpretations of, and emotional responses to, the world can
influence us to a greater or lesser degree, depending on “accessibility,” the
degree to which a concept is likely to be activated and used. Accessibility, in
turn, depends on a number of factors: Expertise, already discussed, involves a
great deal of elaborated knowledge and considerable emotional investment. It
produces high, and chronic, accessibility of relevant concepts. Ideology and
value systems act likewise, with perhaps greater emotional investment.
Operative motives like hunger, fear, affection, or achievement, when active,
render concepts associated with them more accessible, and if the motive is
chronic, the concept’s accessibility is too. Recent use of a concept (for
example “danger,” caused by reading a news story about terrorism or robbery)
makes it temporarily accessible, and experiencing any emotional state also
makes emotionally compatible concepts temporarily accessible.
Why does this
matter? Because if and when one encounters a situation that offers multiple
cues as to its meaning and consequences, those that are relevant to
(“diagnostic of “) our accessible concepts tend to be noticed more easily, and
the situation tends to be interpreted in terms of that concept rather than
another, perhaps equally valid, one. In other words, we experience the world
(at least in part) in terms of that which we are ready to experience. This
process is not deliberate, not open to consciousness, is controllable only with
deliberate effort, and sometimes not then (for a general review, see Bargh,
1994). It happens with respect to our knowledge and our prejudices, positive or
negative, alike (See, for instance, Amodio, et al., 2004; Blair, 2002; Levy,
Stark, & Squire, 2004). Our “situational awareness,” then, whether implicit
or explicit, depends on knowledge, values, current motives, emotional states,
arousal, recent experiences, expectations, fatigue and other physical factors,
and many other variables.
It is definitely true that strong signals from the
environment, cues that stand out sharply from the background, can draw
attention, activate motives and knowledge, thereby directing perception.
However, one can miss even very prominent and unusual events happening before
one’s eyes when active goals lead attention to be fixed elsewhere. Imagine
paying close attention to a video of people playing with a basketball and being
told later that a gorilla walked among the players—a gorilla you didn’t see. It
sounds impossible, but it has happened in more than one experiment. Imagine
talking to someone on the street, being momentarily distracted, and then
resuming the conversation, not noticing that you’re now talking to a different
person. That has happened, too. (Mack, 2003; Simon & Chabris, 1999). The
first is called “inattentional blindness,” the second, “change blindness.” The
good news, though, is that even without awareness of specifics, implicit
processes can signal us—if we are sensitive enough to notice them (Rensink,
2004).
Situation
Awareness and the Armed Citizen
Having some understanding of the nature and origin of
situation awareness, we now turn to understanding its role in self-defense.
Conscious SA is studied in contexts like aviation safety and military
operations; intuitive or implicit SA is only beginning to be studied in domains
such as medicine and law enforcement. There has been no research in the area of
self-defense for the ordinary citizen. How, then, are we to evaluate and apply
the knowledge we have, let alone acquire new information? We need to start by
understanding the differences between the professional’s situation and the
layperson’s or citizen’s. Briefly put, the professional’s job requires and
encourages attention to a limited part of the environment. The job of police
officer, soldier, pilot, firefighter, power plant operator, doctor, nurse, and
so forth, exists to take a limited set of actions with respect to a limited set
of people and conditions. Any other actions or concerns—listening to a sporting
event, arguing with a partner, worrying about the mortgage—are at least
officially out of bounds, regardless of how often they happen in real life. The
fact that mistakes occur—aircraft land on the wrong runway, soldiers get caught
in an ambush, the wrong medicine is given—is evidence that even under the best
of circumstances SA can be imperfect.
The ordinary person concerned with self-defense has a job
that is easier than the professional’s in some ways and harder in others. It is
easier because, except in truly dire circumstances, people are not required to
seek out danger, or carry out missions regardless of danger. The police
officer, soldier, and firefighter ultimately exist in order to confront and
contain danger. The medical professional, though not often at personal risk,
exists to intervene in situations that threaten others’ lives or well-being.
The typical armed citizen or layperson, in contrast, has
little to do with danger on a daily basis and is rarely, if ever, threatened
(except perhaps in traffic). Most can order their lives to minimize their
exposure, and the likelihood of their need for awareness of threat is
correspondingly less. Furthermore, the layperson’s first option is to avoid
rather than face threats. That’s how their job is easier. It is more difficult
because, when danger is present, their knowledge is less accessible, their
skills are likely to be less practiced, and (at least compared to police,
military, and firefighters) their allowable actions are more restricted. Also
unlike the professional “on the job,” the layperson’s attention is directed to
a range of tasks—getting the groceries, making the sale, writing the
article—and these motives and their associated concepts render the knowledge necessary
for SA relatively less accessible. Being mindful of one’s surroundings takes
additional effort and skill, beyond that required for one’s daily life. For the
professional, that is one’s daily
life. Furthermore, unlike many professionals (e.g. soldiers and firefighters),
the armed citizen is likely to be alone, or at least be the only person with
any training, when facing possible danger. In short, the layperson is less
likely to need awareness of threat on a day-to-day basis, but when it is
necessary, he or she must rely on less accessible knowledge, on less practiced
skills, and must create a response from among fewer options.
Some might argue that awareness skills are already in
place, at least for most people. After all, don’t we drive in heavy traffic and
avoid accidents regularly? Doesn’t this require observation and inference, both
conscious and intuitive? Yes, but that is largely irrelevant. One, in traffic
the vast majority just want to get to their destinations. They may be careless,
unskilled, intoxicated, or reckless, but they’re not after you. Second,
regardless of how good a driver you are, the domain of knowledge is different,
and we know that expertise doesn’t transfer well (see, for example, Bedard and
Chi, 1992). For example, I’ve been riding motorcycles for 41 years. I’ve raced,
toured, commuted and cruised, in circumstances ranging from Florida swamps to
Chicago rush hours, in all seasons and all weather. When my helmet goes on, so
does my “race face,” and I move up and down the color code from yellow to
orange to red and back several times a trip. I find myself noticing drivers
about to do something potentially dangerous without knowing why I did, and
likewise know when there are likely to be hazards like gravel or wet leaves on
the road. Yes, I make mistakes when tired or distracted, though probably fewer
than the average person. Nevertheless, when walking around in Atlanta, or on
the Georgia Tech campus, I frequently find myself in Condition White despite my
best intentions (and the efforts of those who’ve trained me). I’ll be in a
hallway, for instance, and someone will pass me from behind, someone I didn’t
know was there. Maybe it’s just me—there are individual differences in SA
(Endsley & Bolstad, 1994)—but there’s likewise substantial data on the
limits of expertise that it makes no sense to ignore.
What to
Train?
SA training, like
any other, requires us to establish both general and specific training
objectives. Our general objective should be to increase two types of correct
actions, and reduce two types of mistakes. We want to increase, first, true positives; that is, to detect
danger when it exists. Klein (1998) gives a vivid account of how a
firefighter’s intuitive misgivings led him to evacuate a seemingly ordinary
house fire just before the floor collapsed. Pinizzotto, Davis, and Miller
(2004) provide a similar example, a police officer’s timely identification of
an armed suspect during a drug raid. Next, we want to increase true negatives; that is, dismiss a
potential source of danger when it is, in fact, harmless. Givens (undated b)
discusses returning to condition yellow after checking a potential danger.
There are no dramatic examples of true negatives, but they are just as
important to accurate SA.
Two types of mistakes require attention because of their
huge potential cost. First, the false
positive identifies danger where none is present. Ayoob (2000) provides a
compelling account of one such mistake, the tragic shooting of Amadou Diallo.
Experienced New York City police officers’ training, motives, expectations, and
emotional state combined with Diallo’s own actions and the marginal environment
to produce a needless death that none intended or imagined could happen.
The second type of mistake, the false negative, is the perception of safety where danger exists.
Just as tragic as Diallo’s death, though not as well publicized, is the murder
of Captain Robbie Bishop of Carrollton County, GA. Captain Bishop, an
experienced officer and expert in drug interdiction, was shot to death in his
patrol car as he wrote a routine traffic citation (www.copsite.com/lwf/lwf99disjon.html;
www.ncea314.com/robbiebishop.asp).
Though we can never know what led Captain Bishop to miss the danger signals his
murderer gave, we must realize that any of us are capable of the same mistake.
Preventing mistakes like these might seem require
contradictory courses of action: training both slower, more thoughtful
responses (to avoid false positives) or faster, more aggressive responses (to
avoid false negatives). Both are wrong. Simply put, at a given level of
information, any change in response threshold (the “mental trigger” that
governs action) to reduce one type of mistake will inevitably increase the
other. Any change made to increase the percent of true positives will also
increase the percent of false positives, and if one acts to increase the rate
of true negatives, false negatives will increase as well. Given any level of
error or uncertainty in our information, this must be true, simply by the laws
of probability.
There are only two ways to reduce the rate of both types
of mistakes while increasing that of both types of correct decisions: to have
information that is more accurate and to use the information at hand better.
These goals are the general objectives of training. The most efficient way to
accomplish them is to find people who are already excellent at gathering and
using information, discover what they know, how they know it, how it is
organized, and how it is used, and teach those things to others. At the same
time, research and further experience can increase our knowledge and the
effectiveness of our training. While it may not be possible to make an expert
of every trainee, we can certainly raise the average and, as in sports, raise
the level of peak performance as well.
Specific
Objectives
A great many people have provided lists of potential
danger signals, and it would be redundant to repeat them here. One thing we
don’t know is whether these signals—the coat in warm weather, the stranger who
watches you or avoids your eyes, and so forth—are the only useful ones. These
are simply the ones that experts can consciously articulate.
We also don’t know for sure what the expert notices about
the environment, beyond the important but obvious features: the location of
exits, the arrangement of tables in a restaurant, the location of cover and
concealment, the position of other patrons in a store, etc. Sometimes, in fact,
even these “obvious” features are unnoticed when we are preoccupied. Therefore,
the first thing we need to know is how the expert scans the environment and how
that information is organized and interpreted. Beyond visuals, we need to know
what is heard, felt, smelled, tasted—even if the expert him- or herself can’t
really tell us. In short, we need research. Some studies can use simulations,
with equipment that tracks eye movements and records scanning patterns of scenes
presented on a video monitor. These can be coupled with verbal probes. Such
studies are now beginning (Force Science News, 2004). More elaborate studies
might employ volunteers wearing glasses containing video cameras, so that areas
attracting attention as the person goes about their daily life can be recorded
and analyzed. GPS devices can track a person’s movement through environments
such as shopping malls. In each case, experts’ and non-experts’ patterns of
attention, movement, and reports of observations can be compared. Probably the
simplest and cheapest method is what we currently do informally: interview people. We typically only
interview after some incident, but I suggest
that we also interview more and less expert observers during and after
routine days, with questions designed to capture not only conscious
observations but also feelings and intuitive signals. Most importantly, we
should employ multiple methods, since each has strengths that complement
another’s drawbacks (see, for instance, Ericsson, 2002).
We should treat the information thus gained as tentative,
as hypotheses rather than facts. If, say, we find a particular pattern of
scanning or movement to be characteristic of experts, its effectiveness can be
tested in training studies and simulations.
Waiting for research to provide all the answers, though,
is unnecessary and counterproductive.
“The perfect is the enemy of the good.” Our knowledge may not be
perfect, but it will never be. With our present technology and experience, we
can train not only attention to known danger signals, but also the elaborated
situational models that support both conscious and implicit awareness as well
as action. As we gain knowledge, we can incorporate it into ongoing training.
We can also train observational skills. Although these are
not independent of specific knowledge and situational models, each can
reinforce the others. Scanning, listening, awareness of change, and especially
attention to implicit responses—“feelings”-- will
add a dimension now missing from most training.
We can also train motivation towards two goals: to attend
to one’s environment, and to practice the skills necessary to awareness. While
those who choose to arm themselves are already “motivated,” the specific motive
to attend to one’s environment must compete with others, even motives as
mundane as remembering to pick up a gallon of milk, or to get the car’s oil
changed. Likewise, the motive to improve one’s skills at observation,
inference, and intuition must compete with other ordinary motives on a
moment-to-moment basis, and compete long-term for our limited attention, time,
and energy.
We also need to train immediate action skills. In one
sense, these are the focus of most of our current training in armed or unarmed
combat. But all of these presuppose that we have identified a real danger. What
if we are uncertain? It’s apparent that there are real individual differences
in the skills that gain us the distance and time to make better judgments; they
emerge reliably in simulations and assessments like the ATSA Village scenarios,
but if they have been systematized anywhere, I’m not aware of it. Once again,
expert reports and careful observation might be valuable.
How to
Train
Before considering training techniques, we need to establish
measures of performance. Without reliable and valid feedback, effective
learning doesn’t happen. Without useful measures of awareness, we are unable to
evaluate the effectiveness of training. At present, there are two types of
measures: individual knowledge of situations, assessed by direct questioning
during or after simulations (Endsley, Sollenberger, & Stein, 2000; Jones
& Endsley, 2000; Matthews, Pleban, Endsley, & Strater, 2000) and
performance scores on tasks that require situational knowledge (Pritchett,
Hausman, & Johnson, 1996). The latter are likewise measured via
simulations. Both types are limited. Questioning does not assess the connection
of knowledge to action, and is limited to the contents of awareness. If not
properly conducted, questioning itself may bias the results (see Ericsson,
2002). Performance measures, unless very carefully designed, do not provide
specific knowledge of the timing and content of awareness, though they reflect
both implicit and explicit processes. Fortunately, the two methods are
complementary. Both can and should be used.
Situational
Models and Danger Signals
These need to be discussed together, because signals are
only meaningful as parts of a cognitive model. Without an elaborated model, a
list of signals is no more meaningful or easy to use than a laundry list. If
our goal is to create expert-level models to guide perception and response, we
need to do it the same way other kinds of expertise are created: deliberate,
guided practice (Ericsson & Charness, 1994; Ericsson, Krampe, &
Tesch-Romer, 1993). But at what tasks?
I suggest that we can incorporate the desired skills into
a number of tasks. First, the technology of first-person video games can be
adapted to present realistic scenarios based on existing and future knowledge.
For example, we know that behavior such as voice tone and posture can
communicate intention and emotional state (see de Gelder, et al., 2004, for a
recent example.) There is no reason why subtle signals of danger or safety,
once discovered, can’t be represented in video games as well as they are in
movies. They should include active response options, to build connections
between SA and multiple options for action. The chess master’s perception of a
position automatically calls up sets of effective moves and countermoves, and
this automaticity additionally provides the capacity needed to create new
options. The novice, meanwhile, is searching memory or “dithering,” trying to
make a choice. Our training should aim at producing the master’s kind of skill.
These games have the advantage of being usable at home, easily upgraded,
adaptable to any skill level and relatively inexpensive. While they lack
important elements of realism (physical movement, for instance) they are
certainly no worse than other training simulations. They can be programmed to
probe for knowledge at random intervals and to provide detailed performance
feedback.
We can incorporate realistic awareness training into
recreational activities such as IDPA competition. Right now IDPA tests
marksmanship, movement, and gun-handling skills, but there is no reason why we
can’t build threat identification and avoidance into scenarios. I’ve been
impressed, for instance, by the creativity of a number of friends who devised
inexpensive moving targets and “pop-out” threat cues. My local Polite Society
group has made efforts along these lines, too, and of course, it’s a central
theme of the NTI.
More elaborate training facilities offer “shoot-houses” of
varying levels of complexity. Every year, entrepreneurs offer visits to
Halloween “haunted houses” starting about October 1, and firms exist that will
set them up in any warehouse or other space. It seems to me an easy step to
combine these creations, using airsoft training weapons if the use of live-fire
or simunitions weapons is not feasible. While obviously too elaborate and
costly for everyday use, they could be employed to teach both awareness and
response skills, with immediate feedback.
As digital video recording becomes less expensive, this technology
can also be incorporated into training. Having a visual reference for feedback
and review (e.g. “See how you walked past that doorway?”) could be very helpful in correcting mistakes
and in planning more effective actions.
Mental rehearsal is another valuable practice routine.
Widely used in sports training and in a variety of therapies, (see, e.g., Dunn,
2001; Swets & Bjork, 1990), visualization and mental rehearsal skills can
be easily learned and practiced almost anywhere. Combined with video and text
materials, and guided by formal instruction, visualization and rehearsal can
help integrate and elaborate one’s mental models of situations, habits of
observation, and patterns of response. A technique suggested by several
trainers is to read crime reports in the local newspaper and visualize one’s
response to the situation. We can easily expand this to visualizing and
rehearsing scanning patterns and behavioral signals that trigger effective
action.
Feedback is necessary for practice to build skill. I
suggest applying awareness skills consciously, as we go through our daily
routines. We can test ourselves by recording, for example, how many times per
day we have to suddenly stop because someone we didn’t notice came out of a
doorway or around a corner, or at lunch by trying to remember the location of
exits in our restaurant.
Motivation
for Awareness
It might seem silly to say that one needs to learn the
motivation to be aware of one’s surroundings, especially to NTI participants.
We know, however, that motives must be active to guide perception and action,
and that motives compete for our limited attentional capacity (see, e.g., Bargh
& Gollwitzer, 1994; Feldman Barrett, Tugade, & Engle, 2004). In order
to influence our awareness reliably, then, the motive to be aware needs chronic activation.
Motives arise because classes of actions are consistently
associated with pleasurable outcomes, or the avoidance of painful ones.
Effective soldiers, firefighters, and police officers maintain awareness for
two simple reasons: they may die if they don’t, and their partners, teammates
and buddies both support and depend on them.
Supporters, though, rarely surround armed citizens—in
fact, we’re likely to be dismissed as “paranoid”—and the presence of danger is
far less frequent and obtrusive. That means that, most of the time, each person
has to reward him- or herself. We can set up self-reward schedules based on our
self-evaluated performance and alertness, as discussed above. It may be a
feeling of accomplishment we allow ourselves to have, an extra helping of
dessert, a cigar after dinner, or $5 towards something we want to buy—the trick
is to develop a consistent habit of thought and action around awareness.
We can build positive reinforcement into our group practices
and competitions as well. People are social creatures, and receiving approval
and status for an activity is a powerful incentive as well as a way to make the
activity itself rewarding. When awareness tests are included in competition
scenarios, and we create a social norm of mutual encouragement and
reinforcement, we’ve taken an important step in creating a chronically active
motive.
Motivation
to Train
Ericsson, et al. (1993) and Ericsson and Charness (1994)
find that many years of dedicated practice are necessary to achieve world-class
expertise in any field. Furthermore, they note that most people do not
deliberately practice after attaining minimal skill at some activity; they play
for fun, not for keeps. How do experts discipline themselves to attain peak
performance? Is this level of dedication necessary to our goals?
Fortunately, the answer to second question is “no.” What’s
necessary is to be better, and to seek continual improvement. While it’s true
that in life-threatening situations there is no such thing as “good enough,”
it’s also true that we all have other areas of our lives that are as or more
important on a daily basis. The crucial goal is to make improving awareness an
integral part of daily activities, not something that unduly interferes with
them.
If training is a source of frustration and anxiety, it’s
not going to be done, and will undermine awareness motives as well. The trick
to maintaining “motivation control” and “emotion control’ (Kanfer &
Ackerman, 1995) lies in knowing how to set goals, what goals to set, and how to
react to them.
We know that setting difficult, specific goals improves
performance on well-learned tasks and inhibits learning at early stages.
Self-focused attention and negative emotion seem to be the culprits in the
latter. That suggests avoiding specific goals early in training, instead
adopting a “mastery” orientation—that is, focusing on improvement, regardless
of the rate. This needs to be combined with self-reinforcement for any
improvement, however small, and periods of reflection on task strategies. That
is, regard feedback as information, rather than as evaluation, and use it to
explore various means of improving performance. As skill builds, specific goals
can be adopted, keeping the “mastery’ approach. The logic is that there is no
pre-set upper limit to performance, no “good enough” point, but that
improvement is its own reward.
Directing attention to the task rather than the self is
only half the story, though. A learning process necessarily creates mistakes,
and for at least some people mistakes create negative emotions that can not
only interfere with learning but also lead to withdrawal. Some people become
anxious at the thought of doing any activity at which they may fail, with
similar results. Teaching emotion management skills can increase performance
and allow the activity itself to become enjoyable. A variety of techniques,
such as controlled relaxation combined with visualization, can short-circuit
anxiety. “Positive self-talk” is a way of making emotionally positive ideas and
concepts accessible in stressful situations. These, combined with rehearsal and
visualization of skills, can enhance skill and motivation simultaneously.
Conclusion
This paper has not been nearly so much about answers as questions;
How should we regard “situation awareness”? How is our knowledge of the world
organized, and how might we use that organization to our advantage? What do
experts know that the rest of us don’t? How can we capture that knowledge, and
transfer it efficiently? The theories, data, and methods discussed here
represent (in my opinion) our best current answers to those questions, but if
science teaches us anything it’s that the questions count more than the
answers, and that we make progress by learning to ask different questions.
Experience teaches us that some of the most productive questions come from
observations of the world, especially observations of the solutions people find
to the daily problems they face. I hope that this paper stimulates people to
explore, ponder, discuss, and evaluate in practice the ideas summarized here,
and that the process proves to be of benefit even if some or all of the ideas
are wrong. This will take time and effort. That shouldn’t be discouraging. As
engineers say about any kind of project or product:
You can have it good.
You can have it fast.
You can have it cheap.
Pick two.
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