QUITTERS AND
OTHER SUCH
REVOLTING
RIFF-RAFF
“Winners never
quit and quitters never win!”
The advice of a
caring Father to his son.
“Today’s
Defeatists”, by Donald Kagan is a must read for those who value the
lesson of history as instructions for the present.
In his
article, Kagan recites the nature and actions of the Copperheads
during the American Civil War. He compares that history to today’s
debate over the future of the World War on civilizations enemies
that, for the moment, is centered in the Middle East. Kagan
concentrates on the Copperheads role in the war but he fails to
mention the concomitant role of Southern military strategy.
Most Americans
with a high school graduation date prior to 1980 know there was a
pivotal Civil War battle fought at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. Some
even know that there were other attempts by Robert E. Lee, Gen’l,
CSA, to enter Pennsylvania by the same route at other times during
the war. Few know why.
Lee is well
known for his battlefield strategy and tactics. He was daring,
aggressive and energetic. He knew the nature of the Generals
Lincoln called upon and he knew how to exploit their respective
nature’s. Lee is less known for his abilities as a war strategist.
From the time he was given command of the Army of Northern Virginia
he had a plan to win the war. His plan, which he shared with and
was endorsed by Jefferson Davis, relied heavily on the defeatist
personality of elements of the northern community. Lee’s war plan,
much like his battle plans, was the product of necessity born of
desperation.
From the
moment he rejected command of the forces of the North, Lee was
painfully aware of the dire comparative conditions in pitting the
forces of the North against the South. The resources in the North,
man-power, equipment, industry and economic were infinite. Similar
resources in the South were finite, comparatively miniscule and
unreliable. What he and his men had were determination and a will
to prevail. Lincoln acknowledged this in his comment, after trying
several unsuccessful Generals, that he had to find a commander who
understood the math. The North could sustain 10 to 1 loss ratios
and still prevail. Anything, most particularly men, the South lost
could not be replaced.
Facing these
realities, Lee recognized there was a political element in the North
that wanted political humiliation and would be useful to him in
their pursuit. His war plan involved invading the North in hopes
that the virus of defeatism would spread. He invaded by way of the
Shenandoah in 1862, 1863 and 1864. The ’62 and ’64 invasions were
limited in scope, but were for the same purpose.
The
Copperheads obliged General Lee. The press wrote articles and the
DC politicians wailed that Lincoln was incompetent; he was usurping
the Constitution, (which he did quite directly and often) that he
was a dullard and stupid and, most importantly, the only answer was
a political one, not a military one. There were even articles and
politicians who publicly hoped for Lincoln’s violent death.
By the late
spring of 1864 most historians agree that Lincoln had little chance
of re-election that fall. Then, in late summer, three Union
Generals set a course on “total war”. U. S. Grant tied Lee’s forces
in a series of fights. W. T. Sherman took his troops to Atlanta and
burned a 60 mile path to the Atlantic. His stated goal was to “make
Georgia howl” and to create conditions where a crow desiring to fly
across Georgia would need to pack a lunch. During his march to the
sea, Sherman’s forces killed only about 600 Confederate soldiers,
while 10,000 were killed by Union forces in Virginia. Yet, in the
South, for 100 years after the Civil War Sherman was the most
reviled of the Union Generals. Such is the effect of making a
general populace feel the sting of defeat in the exercise of total
war.
General
Phillip Sheridan mirrored Sherman as he marched up the Shenandoah
Valley.
In the summer
of 1864 the effect these generals would have on the South was yet in
the future. The Copperheads took control of the Democrat national
Convention and nominated General George B. McClellan, Lincoln’s
first commander of the Northern forces, for President with a
platform of negotiating a peace with the South. Lincoln expected to
loose the election.
As the
election approached and the three Generals did their work, Admiral
David Farragut took Mobile Harbor, giving the command “Damn the
torpedoes, full speed ahead!”
Lincoln won
the 1864 election by about the same percentage of the popular vote
as President Bush did the 2004 election. Still, no one south of the
Mason-Dixon Line, strong-hold of the Democrat Party, voted in the
1864 election. As Kagan notes in his article, the Democrat Party
paid politically for their embracement of defeatism for a generation
after the Civil War.
While General
Lee was not an enemy of the our country, he did recognize there were
those within the country who would stop at little to demean and
humiliate the country, especially if there was a sort of political
advantage to be gained. As a good and able General he took
advantage of the tools and weaknesses available.
While Kagan’s
article does not mention it, there has been an element within
American society from colonial times that have followed the idea of
American humiliation. They were called Tories at the time and
various other things since. They are ever present and functioning
and seem to rear their head especially in time of war. While Kagan
asserts they were not present in the World Wars, he apparently
discounts the efforts of Henry Wallace and those who worked on the
Manhattan Project that gave the secrets to the Soviet Union during
and after WWII because they did not “trust” the United States with
such power.
Still, the
most maddening portion of Kagan’s article is his reference to the
“defeat” of America in the Vietnam War. North Vietnamese General
Giat notes that the American Military Forces in Vietnam defeated his
forces on the battlefield. He further notes, that just as General
Lee realized a century before, the defeatist element of the American
community could be counted on to change the math. They did, and for
the same reasons, humiliation and political advantage.
As historians
Schweikart and Allen note, the most dangerous time for America
during the Cold War was between 1976 and 1980. By that time it was
apparent to the Russians that shear economics and technology put
them in the same position as the South during the American Civil
War. On the other hand, America had shown a willingness to embrace
humiliation. It had abandoned allies on the field. It had elected
a President that babbled about “malaise” and wore sweaters in the
White House to “conserve” energy. When a small group of low grade
thugs seized an American Embassy, the American people tolerated a
President who wrung his hands. Why wouldn’t the Kremlin, in full
appreciation of their Southern-like circumstance, consider launching
a nuclear first strike on U. S. Military targets and immediately
call a hand-wringer with an offer to do nothing further in exchange
for any retaliation?
In this
current World War, bin Laden shows more knowledge of American
history than our high school and college graduates since 1980. He
operates as an American history professor every time he sends a
message to the people of the U. S. His history lessons are meant
less to inform the American audience than to embolden others like
Russia and China along with dozens of other small time despots and
Europeans who smugly tell themselves their pandering posture has
benefit. He wagers there are no more Grants, Sherman’s, Sheridan’s,
Perishing, or Patton’s, and if there are, they will be leashed by
the Copperheads and their progeny.
We are on the
eve of September 11th. Lt. General Petreas sits in front
of Congress making his report on one of the fronts in this World War
as this is written. Time will tell us if the American people will
again embrace the humiliation promulgated by those whose father’s
cared for them so little that they failed to teach them about
winners and quitters.
Whatever the
decision, the future will follow the path of history attached to
those decisions. Lincoln, as well as Lee, knew his history. When
he was harangued about the need for a “political” settlement in
stead of a military victory he pointed out that such a decision
would merely set aside the issue for a future date and the cost
would be greater amounts of blood and treasure than finishing the
job extant.
The same will
be true of us, here and now. We will be winners or quitters as we
choose.
