THE ORIGINAL 9/11

Brandywine, Pa. September 11, 1777

July 21, 2007

THE SITUATION

The shooting war that was the American Revolution had been going on for about a year and a half.  General George Washington was having a bad time.  British forces had forced to leave Boston.  He had nearly been demolished in New York City and had been forced to abandon the city to the British.  Now the British were about to invade Philadelphia, then serving as the Capital of the individual states that were struggling for independence from the British Crown.

European warfare of the time was premised on the sound defeat of the opposing states forces and/or the threatened or actual taking of the capital city.  British General Howe intended to take Philadelphia and the Continental Congress after thrashing Washington and hopefully capturing his army.

Howe left New York by ship and landed 15,000 troops at the upper reaches of the Chesapeake Bay.  He marched towards southeastern Pennsylvania.  Washington, with 11,000 troops, was waiting for him along the Brandywine Creek at Chads Ford.  The stage was set for the largest engagement of troops in the western hemisphere to occur before the American Civil War.

BACKGROUND

After Lexington and Concord, the Continental Congress debated the goals of the fighting for 15 months.  Most of the delegates saw themselves as loyal British subjects and were not inclined to declare independence.  Still, as elected representatives of their respective communities, they were from a select group of Americans.  Historians divide the approximately 2.5 million Americans that populated the colonies into four groups.  About 30% saw themselves as what would become known as “patriots”, about the same percentage saw themselves as what would become known as “loyalists” about the same percentage could not make up their minds and tried to remain aloof and the rest were on the frontier and were largely unaffected or interested.

What distinguished the first two groups was that the patriots recognized they had a distinctly American culture.  They rejected the European concept of privilege based on birth status.  They embraced the idea that each man was at liberty to make his own way and could rise to whatever he was capable of.  While specific sections of the colonies saw the terms “liberty” and “freedom” in different ways, there was a consensus among the patriots that freemen did not need to be told what was good for them by anyone.  This group supplied the members of Congress.

The loyalists preferred the European model of political thinking.  They were not members of Congress.

While the members of Congress were reluctant to break their ties to England initially, they were willing to fight from the beginning.  The evidence is in the first actions they took as a group.  They promptly decided to send a military commander to assume control of the ad hoc units in New England.  Washington was made General of the Continental forces and left for Boston.  In June, 17775, the first military unit representing the Congress of the states was commissioned.  Congress specifically called for the formation of a rifle regiment.  The men were to be selected from the “back country” of Pennsylvania, Maryland and Virginia.  The back country was not the frontier.  The inhabitants of this portion of the states were dispositionally, very independent.  They were not anti-government.  They were not anti-authoritarian.  They just wanted to be left alone by those who were of a disposition to mind another person’s business.  Generally, they had little time for those who were of a cosmopolitan bent which they saw as frivolous.  They looked after themselves and their own and fended for themselves.  They were men of action and they could shoot.  They arrived in Boston in mid-summer.

In Boston, General Washington had a problem.  He had very little powder and lead.  He had to buy some time to get supplies.  The British were close at hand.  He had to give them pause.  General Washington decided to have a shooting demonstration.  He invited lots of spectators including the press. 

The riflemen hit targets the size of a mans chest at three times the effective range of any musket.  They fired as groups at poles set at 200 yards until the pole was cut in half.  They took turns holding planks of wood measuring about 5x10 inches as other members of their group shot into the plank at ranges beyond that of muskets.  Some of the riflemen held the planks between their knees as bullets passed through the pieces of wood.  The message was clear.  These men were willing to kill specific people they targeted and they were not afraid of bullets passing close to them.  For those who needed additional information about the temperament of these men, they carried tomahawks in their belts.  The story of their ability and disposition spread. 

The riflemen had another shooting demonstration in mind.  They went off on their own to kill British soldiers as they moved about their camps.  Officers were preferred targets.  The British were both appalled and afraid.  Washington got the time he needed to solve his logistical problems.

The reason the British were fearful of these American Riflemen was self-evident.  The reason they were appalled was dispositional.  European warfare had evolved a set of rules.  Battles were determined by which set of forces remained in control of the “field” at the end of the engagement.  In effect, the looser was driven from the field.  Threatening to take or actually taking a city that was the seat of government of the enemy was determinative to capitulation.  Killing members of the opposing force was necessary, but targeting specific individuals was viewed as morally repugnant.

The British army did not even have an “aim” command.  They leveled their muskets in the direction of the enemy formation, looked aside, and fired on command.  They quickly reloaded and fired again. Following three or four such volleys, they executed a bayonet charge.  They caused the enemy line to break and flee.

By contrast, the Americans had an “aim” command, even when using muskets.  American had no compunction about targeting specific individuals.  Riflemen merely refined the art.  This essential dispositional difference lead D. H. Lawrence to observe, “The essential American soul is hard, isolate, stoic and a killer”.

Revealing their own essential disposition, American historians of the second half of the 20^th Century have derided the value of the American militia and the riflemen.  General Howe had a different view.  He issued orders for the capture of one of the American riflemen and his equipment.  Timothy Doutrich of Dover Township, York County, Pennsylvania was captured and sent to England.  There, he was taken on tour of the county and required to put on shooting demonstrations.  This idea probably was not conducive to a military recruitment drive.

By 1776, General Howe made it clear he needed riflemen.  Hessian “jaegers” were hired.  The General also turned to a young Captain named Patrick Ferguson.

Ferguson and his Rifle

Captain Ferguson was very interested in shooting.  He did a lot of it.  He was also, as an officer, concerned about the welfare of his men.  He understood that standing men get shot a lot more often than those who presented a lower profile, preferably prone.  Muzzle loading weapons were difficult to load unless the shooter was standing up-right.  A breech-loading weapon changed the manual of arms.  Ferguson found a breech-loading design that had existed for decades.  He convinced the British government that this design could be adapted to military use.  Two demonstrations, one to the military and one to the King, sold each audience with the idea that British made military rifles could answer the American riflemen. 

Ferguson was placed in charge of the rifle project.  General Howe’s call for rifles in 1776 was answered with unheard of speed in military acquisition of the times.  Starting in the fall of 1776 and continuing until the spring of 1777, Ferguson personally presided over the production of 100 rifles.  Any question about the importance of answering the American Riflemen, and thus the British view of their role on the battlefield, must consider that Ferguson, a young military officer, ordered about, under the authority of the Crown, the most expert gun makers in Britain.  Master gunsmiths, who were forced to labor for at least 15 years to learn their craft, were answerable to a young soldier.  Each part of each gun and its accouterments were inspected an approved by Ferguson.  The work was pushed so as to have the guns and Ferguson in America by the spring, 1777 offensive.

Ferguson developed a special bayonet that also functioned as a sword.  The lock work on the guns was of a German design that made the lock time as fast as percussion guns that were decades from practical development.  Unlike other flint guns of the time, this gun could be loaded and fired in rain and wind.  American gun barrels would foul within a half-dozen rounds.  Their accuracy was compromised until they could be cleaned, a long and arduous process, especially in battle conditions.  The Ferguson fun could fire 30 rounds before it required a thorough cleaning.  The barrel would begin to foul after a half-dozen rounds, but could be returned to its accuracy potential by opening the breach, plugging the chamber with an unpatched ball, and pouring water down the barrel to loosen the fouling enough for the next fired round to clear the bore.  Like any rifle of exceptional accuracy potential, the Ferguson gun required a special powder and a particular load.  It also accepted a bayonet, more that 2’ in length and double edged, kept with a razors edge.

All of that was the up-side.  The down-side, especially as the British military saw such matters, was that each example was a one-man-gun.  At a time when the British soldier fired, perhaps a half-dozen practice shots, three or four times a year, Ferguson made it clear that each of his riflemen would need to fire about 300 rounds to reach proficiency with the weapon.  In addition, the dropping breech plug on each weapon was so unique, only the soldier to whom it was issued could effectively use it.

Still, here was Captain Ferguson, his gun and his trained men at Kennett Square, Pennsylvania on the eve of September 11^th.  The stage was set for not only one of the major battles of the American Revolution, but for one of the most incredible incidents in American history.

THE BATTLE OF BRANDYWINE

It is fashionable among recent historians to discount Washington’s skills as a General.  Walking the ground of Brandywine battlefield will likely offer another view.  General Washington predicted where the British would advance towards Philadelphia.  The terrain he selected to defend demonstrates his ability to “see” the ground.  The west side of Brandywine Creek at Chads Ford is fairly flat.  The east bank rises immediately into undulating hills.  General Washington arranged his forces along 6 miles of the Brandywine on the east side.  Washington placed artillery to cover the several fords the British would have to cross. 

There were no bridges along the “Great Nottingham Road” (now U. S. Route 1) where it crossed the Brandywine.  There was one ferry, operated by John Chad.  There were also several fords, which were locations where a man could wade across the creek to chest depth.  The British would have to wade the creek into the fire of Americans on the east bank.

General Washington was good at seeing the ground from a defensive view.  He was weak in seeing the ground from an attacker’s point of view.  This short coming had gotten him into trouble in Boston and New York.  It was to cause trouble this day also.  In addition, there was confusion among the American General Officers as to the number and location of the many fords along the Brandywine.

General Washington discounted the idea of a flanking attack by the British.  He assumed General Howe would rely on his superior numbers to make a frontal attack.

General Howe was camped on the night of the 10^th in Kennett Square.  Two days before he had settled on a strategy of a diversionary attack on General Washington’s forces as a way to mask his flanking attack on the American right.  Howe realized he could get on the Birmingham Road, above and behind the American lines and run the road along the ridge behind Washington’s line to a point on the Great Nottingham Road east of Washington’s forces.  The Americans would be trapped against the river and the remainder of the British forces.

At 4:30 am on the 11^th, Howe took personal command of General Cornwallis’ 8000 men and marched them north out of Kennett Square.  They began a 17 mile forced march, dragging cannon with them.  They used a series of ridges to conceal their movement.

After sun-up, American forces moved across the Brandywine to the east bank and began scouting patrols.  About 9:00 am one of the patrols decided to take a break at a tavern a few miles east of Kennett Square.  Tying their horses out front, they went in to refresh themselves.  As they exited the front door they saw British soldiers within 100 yards.  It was Captain Ferguson and his 100 Rifleman accompanied by about 300 additional British soldiers armed with a special short rifle similar to the German “Jaeger”.  It was the forward point of the British advance to Chad’s Ford.  Shots were exchanged and the Americans ran back into the tavern and out the back door.  The first shots of the battle had been fired.

Captain Ferguson had a very bad assignment.  He was to take his force of about 400 men and cross the Brandywine at what was referred to as the lower ford.  He was then to move north along what is now called Creek Road to eliminate the American artillery emplacements.  It was perhaps 400 yards of deadly ground.  Before the end of the day he would loose half of his men and be made a cripple for life.  He would also make one of the most fateful decisions in history.

Throughout the morning and into the early afternoon, General Washington receives a continuing series of confused reports that all point to a movement of British troops headed north several miles east of his location at John Chad’s house.  He considers the possibility that General Howe is trying to flank him but also suspects that Howe is moving on Reading where American military stores are kept.  He is still convinced the main attack will come to his front.

Meanwhile Captain Ferguson has acquired a location in front of John Chad’s house.  He and some of his men are concealed by vegetation.  He sees two officers on horse back moving along the American lines at Creek Road.  He later writes a report expressing his dismay at seeing one of the officers dressed in a Polish Officers uniform.  The other officer, a large man on a large horse comes to within 100 yards of Ferguson. 

Captain Ferguson was well documented as a fine shot.  With his rifle he had fired 6 shots per-minute and hit man-sized targets at 200 yards.  Still, he was an officer in the British army.  Killing a man from ambush, especially and officer was grotesque to him. 

Upon seeing the American officer so close, Captain Ferguson stepped from his position of cover and demanded the surrender of the officer.  The officer turned his horse about and calmly rode away towards the American lines.  As Ferguson later wrote in his report, he could have placed as many as 6 rounds on the officer before he was out of range.  But then again, he would have to shoot an officer in the back.  Captain Ferguson held his fire.  Within minutes, Captain Ferguson was struck in the right elbow.  The bone was shattered beyond repair.

It took Captain Ferguson about a year to heal from the wound.  All the surgeons recommended amputation.  The arm was useless.  Keeping it was very dangerous because of the constant bouts he had with infection.  Pain was constant.  For months pieces of bone worked their way out through the skin in a most excruciating way.  Still, the only way he could maintain a commission was to have all of his extremities, working or not.  Ferguson wanted a command.  He got one in time to meet his fate at King’s Mountain, South Carolina.

Captain Ferguson’s reports do not identify the officer as General Washington.  The description seems to fit.  What is known is that General Pulaski, recently commissioned by the Continental Congress, and Washington were at John Chad’s house at the time Captain Ferguson confronted the officer. 

Many historians of recent times discount the incident.  Some apparently suggesting nothing of the kind happened.  Others object, claiming there is no “proof” that the officer was General Washington.  Many criminal defense lawyers would pray to have these skeptical historians on their juries.

The best evidence would suggest that, but for the “essential” difference between the American and British Rifleman, the War for Independence would likely have ended that September the 11^th.

But General Washington had other problems.  It was now apparent that General Howe was at the rear of the right of his lines.  They were about to attack.  American troops were moving quickly at the Birmingham Quaker Meeting house and the adjacent fields to form up to meet the attack.  But it was Tea Time.  General Howe halted, in full view of the American troops and had his tea. 

Meanwhile General Washington had his reserves on the move.  These incredible men covered 3 miles, across hills and valleys in about 40 minutes and formed up to meet the British.  Americans took cover behind a stone wall at the Meeting house.  The price of tea was very high that afternoon.

The British pushed the Americans back across the ridge to Sandy Hollow.  General Lafayette arrived to rally the Americans.  During the affray he was wounded and removed to a nearby house for treatment.

The British were now moving quickly along the Birmingham Road.  Soon they would have the American forces pinched between the two segments of the British forces.  The Americans quickly withdrew to the east.  The Americans would survive to fight another day.

AFTERMATH

Within a few days the British were in Philadelphia.  They were met with another essential difference between Americans and Europeans.  Taking the Capital City was not determinative.  The Continental Congress moved to York, Pennsylvania.  There they refined and implemented the Articles of Confederation.  The diverse states were now a country.

General Washington moved into winter camp at Valley Forge, Pennsylvania to place himself between the British and Congress.  That brutal winter would be some of the darkest days of the Revolution.  But during that darkness Von Stueban trained the American forces in the art of military drill.  The skills he taught would be of great value at Cowpens and Yorktowne. 

American losses at Brandywine were about 1200.  British were about 1950.  The battle raged over 10 square miles, an enormous battlefield for the time.

Ferguson survived his wounds.  His recuperation was more than a year.  During his recovery the men of his unit were reassigned.  During that year he taught himself to write, eat and use weapons with his left hand.  Once again fit for command, he was promoted to Major and shipped to the Carolina’s as part of Britain’s “new strategy” to win the war.

British records reflect that an order went out to the units that had former members of Ferguson’s Rifles assigned to collect those weapons and return them to New York for re-fit.  Other records reflect that Ferguson ordered as much as 10,000 rounds of the special ball that the Ferguson gun used and the special powder required to make the gun shoot to its potential.

Ferguson reflected on the kind of man he should have using his rifle.  He decided that native born Americans would be better suited to bear the arm because they were much more familiar with weapons than their British counterpart.  In the south, he commanded Loyalists from New York and New Jersey. 

In 1779, Major Ferguson found himself and his command of about 1000 men on King’s Mountain, South Carolina.  He was confronting about the same number of American riflemen from the surrounding communities.  Once again, about 100 of his command were a personal unit assigned to him directly.  Participants in the fight refer to these men as rifleman.  There are accounts of them laying prone and firing repeated shots.  There are references to Ferguson sword bayonets being used at the battle.

All of this and other evidence, as well as the nature of the man to endure his recovery and rehabilitation, convinced the National Park Service that he would not have abandoned his namesake rifle project, that is at least until 1946, as a copy of the Park Service brochure of that date reports. 

Once again, the revisionist historians are skeptical.  If you visit King’s Mountain Battlefield today you are told definitively there were no rifles, including Ferguson rifles in the hands of the British forces.  Eyewitness accounts and supportive documents are insufficient.

As was their disposition, the American forces were there to kill.  The British forces suffered heavy casualties.  The battle ended with Ferguson hit by dozens of American rifle balls.  Men stood about as he laid dying, both shoulders broken and his body riddled with bullet holes.  One can only wonder if he considered the “essential” essence of the American soul.